In 1946, paintings (worth roughly $150) of the plaintiff, Georgia O’Keeffe, were due to appear in an art exhibit owned by Alfred Stieglitz, but they could not be found on the day of the exhibit. Two weeks later, two other paintings by the plaintiff were also missing. The plaintiff did not want to upset Stieglitz, so she did not report the paintings stolen until 1972. However, the plaintiff sold one of the paintings, Seaweed, to one Mrs. Weiner prior to the disappearance. Moreover, 12 or 13 additional paintings were also deemed stolen from the art gallery around the same time. O’Keeffe alleged that a man named Estrick stole the paintings and potentially other items. These items, but not O’Keeffe’s paintings, were returned when Stieglitz confronted Estrick. Furthermore, there was no evidence of a break and entry on the date her paintings, which were apparently uninsured, were stolen. The plaintiff later discovered that a New York gallery, owned by the defendant, was advertising her stolen paintings in 1975. Therefore, O’Keeffe brought a suit in replevin for the paintings against the gallery’s owner, Barry Snyder, after he refused to return them to her. The paintings were allegedly sold to the defendant by Ulrich Frank. Frank claimed continuous possession of the paintings per his father for over 30 years and admitted selling them to the defendant. Neither had knowledge of O’Keeffe’s ownership of the paintings. Snyder moved for a summary judgment, alleging that he was a purchaser for value, O’Keeffe was barred by the statute of limitations, and title was acquired by Ulrich Frank via adverse possession. The plaintiff then filed a cross-motion, alleging that she held title, the paintings were stolen, and the statute of limitations had been prevented from running.
Trial court first issued a summary judgment for the defendant, Barry Snyder, because the plaintiff, Georgia O’Keeffe, was barred from action for not filing the complaint within the six year statute of limitations. The case was then tried in the Appellate Division, which reversed the holding and granted a summary judgment to O’Keeffe against Snyder, for a replevin of three small pictures painted by O’Keeffe.
Does the discovery rule allow for the pausing or delaying of the statute of limitations if the lawful owner of stolen personal property [chattel] acted with due diligence to locate the property?
The discovery rule will fulfill the purpose of a statute of limitations and accord greater protection to the innocent owner of personal property whose goods are stolen or lost if the owner pursues their goods with due diligence, which will prevent the statute of limitations from running.
Per Judge Pollock, a replevin of goods or chattels must be initiated within six years after the incident in question, but citing Wood v. Carpenter, the purpose of the statute of limitations is to “stimulate to activity and punish negligence” and “promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs.” However, courts formulated a doctrine known as the discovery rule that prevents the statute of limitations from running until the lawful owner of the goods/chattels discovers, or by exercise of reasonable due diligence should have discovered, facts that form the basis of the cause of action. In this instance, the court determined that the discovery rule applies to O’Keeffe. To find the defendant liable for damages to O’Keeffe, the trial court must judge if: (1) The plaintiff acted with due diligence to recover the paintings, (2) whether at the time of the asserted theft, an efficient method was available for the plaintiff to convey the incident to the art world, and (3) whether registering for the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. or a similar organization would give constructive notice to a reasonably prudent purchaser of art that the possessor of the paintings was not the true owner. Overall, the doctrine of adverse possession can not be properly applied to this case or similar cases involving stolen personal property because it is difficult to establish what fulfills the requirement of open and hostile possession. The discovery rule, in contrast, better serves the purpose of determining who holds proper title. Likewise, utilizing the discovery rule here and in similar cases shifts the burden of proving the aforementioned factors from the conduct of the possessor to that of the true owner.
The court decided that tacking, the congregation of consecutive periods of possession by parties in privity with each other should be permitted in this matter. Thus, the court reversed and remanded the Appellate Division’s decision for a plenary hearing in accordance with the court’s opinion.